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CDEC Doc Log No. 05-1033-72

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

((Item 1 of O.T.))

No. 33/CV

TOP SECRET ((VC classification))

To: Various district and city security sections

To help you better understand the schemes, operating methods, and tricks of the US and Puppet ((RVN)) security police and intelligence agencies, information on the organization and activities of US and Puppet ((RVN)) intelligence forces from the national level to village level compiled during the last year ((possibly 1970)) is attached. This will help you and concerned units and branches study the specific local situation and provide proper leadership for each area to counter enemy security, police, and espionage activities.

It will also help you conduct political indoctrination courses for cadre and combatants to heighten their revolutionary vigilance which will enable them to maintain internal security and counter psywar, Chiếu Hồi ((Open Arms)) and counterpenetration activities.

Upon receipt of this document, you are requested to study and disseminate it to cadre operating in the local areas so as to effectively detect and counter enemy activities.

Successive reports should be forwarded to the Sub-Region Security Sec for further instructions.

Distributions:

15 Oct 71

C30 } ((possibly agencies of Thu Biên
C40 } Sub-Region)) (in lieu of a report)

For the Security Sec, ((possibly
Thu Biên)) Sub-Region ((Party
Committee, COSVN))

Military Security ((Sec))

/S/ Nguyễn Văn Tấn

All Cs ((possibly companies))

B2 and B3 ((unidentified))

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TX ((unidentified))/18 copies

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C I R C U L A R

CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF ((US AND RVN)) SECURITY, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

I. ORGANIZATION

1. Police Force:

The enemy considers the security and police forces his key forces for attacks against revolutionary installations to implement his pacification program. Therefore, he strengthened their personnel strength and improved their organizational methods.

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The areas of operations of the police force at all levels were also widely developed.

The enemy has changed the "Directorate General of National Police" into the National Police HQ, subordinate to the Presidency. District and province police chiefs and higher have been replaced by reliable and capable lackeys. (Trần Thanh Phong has been designated commander of the ((RVN)) National Police HQ to replace Trần Văn Hai.) Police agencies at all echelons were provided with higher ranking officers. Majors or lieutenant colonels were designated as province police station chiefs. Captains were designated as district police station chiefs and second lieutenants as village police station chiefs. The CIA force also assigned additional US advisors to the ((RVN)) police force at district level. (The number of CIA personnel concurrently operating as US advisors in district police stations is 337.)

The enemy paid particular attention to strengthening the village police stations because he considered them the key force among the people and used them to attack our hamlet and village revolutionary installations.

Each police station had 50 members (one field police B ((platoon)), and two secret police cells to conduct surprise attacks against our installations). There are altogether 2,517 villages in SVN. The enemy planned to establish 2,130 village police stations. Of them, 1,650 have been established.

Strength: Police strength has rapidly developed as follows:

1964: 40,000 men

1965: 55,000 "

1966: 65,000 "

1967: 73,700 "

1968: 66,520 "

(Police strength decreased in 1968, because many policemen were killed during our ((1968)) General Offensive and Uprising Phase).

1969: 80,000 men

1970: 108,000 men

In 1971, the enemy planned to increase the police force personnel strength to 244,000 men. On the average, one policeman will control five families. (The enemy also planned to increase this force to 300,000 men to satisfy the requirements of the pacification program and gradually assume local activities of Regional Force troops who will be upgraded to Regular Forces. Gò Công and An Giang Provinces are used as experimental sites for this plan.)

According to plans each province was to have 5,000 policemen ((49 provinces)) ((sic)), and each district was to have 300 men (260 districts) ((sic)).

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However, primary efforts were focussed on the development of the field police force (500 field policemen for each province and 120 for each district) and the special police force. In addition, the enemy established a secret ((security)) network in hamlets and villages. Each village planned to have from 20 to 30 secret informants, excluding the number of hamlet and village Puppet administrative personnel who assumed police responsibilities. According to the enemy's plans, all Puppet administrative personnel must each have from three to five secret informants. The enemy will choose the most qualified of them to train as new lackeys.

Of the ((RVN)) national police, the most dangerous elements are the special police (operating secretly), the field police (suppressing and terrorizing the revolutionary movement), and the police interrogation teams (torturing and exploiting captured revolutionary cadre and agents). Almost all of them are tyrants, scoundrels, and antirevolutionaries who were selected by the enemy to serve as key cadre in the national police force.

The CIA also provided the ((RVN)) National Police Force with sufficient scientific and technical communication liaison facilities, weapons, and financial aid as follows:

1963: \$32.9 million ((US))

1964: \$48 "

1965: \$68.2 "

1966: \$176.5 "

1967: \$273.4 "

1968: \$220.6 "

1969: \$168.6 "

1970: \$168.2 "

(The amount of money was decreased from 1968 to 1970 to lighten the US expenditures. Therefore, the Puppet government had to exploit ((the people)) to cover the requirements of the National Police.)

In training: Primary training courses were conducted for the special police force. The essence of the training was infusing the trainees with reactionary ideology and transforming them into tyrannical and capable henchmen to work against the glorious Revolution. It was also aimed at training them in specialized skills and on the methods of secret operations, such as recruitment of secret informants, planting personnel in our internal organizations, kidnapping and assassination, etc... ((sic)). The enemy placed much emphasis on the training of agents operating in the different areas, such as among the ethnic minority people, religious followers, and in R region ((possibly in the Khmer Republic)).

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The enemy successfully trained a number of key cadre in the National Police Force as follows:

841 cadre ranking from investigators up

433 female action cadre (Thien Nga)

172 intermediate interrogators

He also selected a number of officers, captain and higher, and sent them to foreign countries (US, Malaysia, and the Phillipines) to study intelligence organizations. A training session was conducted to train 60 females (Khmers) in Tra Vinh ((Province)) to send them to K ((Khmer)) Battlefield to operate. Policemen at village level, village and hamlet Puppert administrative personnel, and assistant village security section chiefs who already received training numbered 20,000 men (in 1970).

The National Police Force in ((RVN)) MR 3, planned to have 28,000 trained policemen by the end of the first half of 1971.

According to enemy plans, all policemen were to be well trained in 1971. The training requirements to be satisfied in 1971 were as follows:

1,200 intermediate level policemen

23,920 low level agents

120 commanders of river patrol boats

6,704 intelligence cadre (1,604 intermediate and 5,100 low level cadre)

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2. The Special Central Intelligence Office (subordinate to the Presidency)

The total number of personnel in this office, according to our estimation, is over 2,000 of men. (They are all key intelligence cadre and personnel who have been carefully selected.) Its main activities were conducted secretly (by its agents who operated under the name of social and specialized organizations, political factions, religions, and ethnic minority groups) and placed emphasis on fifth columnists. All fifth columnist activities were to be reported to the Special Central Intelligence Office in order to keep abreast of the situation and provide proper guidance.

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At present, ^NTran Kim Tuyen and ^NNguyen Van Y are ((President)) Thieu's advisors.

Y is now trying to establish a secret security network throughout city wards and the rural areas. It is to be completed by Jun 71. (To organize this network, Y must recruit a number of leaders and members for different networks, determine their areas of operation, and select some civilian houses to use for their secret activities.)

All Special Central Intelligence Office cadre and personnel enjoy many privileges. They have undercover operating funds and a higher salary than members of the National Police Force and are authorized to recruit members of the National Police Force for the Special Central Intelligence Office.

3. Military Intelligence Agency

The MI Agency was established by the Joint General Staff at village and hamlet levels.

All MI Services of the Joint General Staff, various military regions, and regular force units planted their agents in important strategic areas of operation to establish secret intelligence networks (with intelligence network chiefs and secret informants) in order to collect intelligence information, recruit fifth columnists, and operate in main objectives to establish footholds for attacking our bases and border areas.

In provinces, the enemy organized military intelligence networks throughout sectors, sub-sectors (at district level), and posts manned by the Regional, Popular, and People's Self-Defense Forces (in villages and hamlets).

Formerly, a sector military intelligence service was placed under the command of a captain, but now it is commanded by a major. It is composed of the following six sections:

1. Information Collection Sec
2. Section in charge of recruiting secret intelligence agents
3. Military Operations and Planning Sec
4. Special Force Sec
5. Interrogation Sec
6. Rear Service Sec.

Each military intelligence service sector was composed of from 80 to 130 agents. (For instance: The Hau Nghia Sector had 52 intelligence agents and 78 Special Force troops.)

A military intelligence service sub-sector was formerly under the Command of a first lieutenant but is now commanded by a captain. It has from 30 to 40 agents.

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Deputy commanders of Regional Force Inter-Units and posts manned by the Regional and Popular Forces were in charge of the intelligence task. They also recruited secret informants, collected intelligence information, detected revolutionary forces in their infrastructures, and coordinated with public security and national police members to attack and destroy our forces.

In People's Self-Defense Force units, the enemy recruited informants to conduct secret activities. (They were usually selected from the People's Self Defense Force personnel.)

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In 1970, the enemy held six intelligence training courses for 491 intelligence agents. In addition, each village selected a number of People's Self-Defense Force personnel and sent them to intelligence training courses.

Military security personnel: (RVN) military security personnel operated in various (RVN) armed services, and in Regular and Regional Force units to protect (RVN) internal ranks and counter our ((VC)) activities within the Puppet Army. All units of company size and higher had military security officers.

At the end of 1970, the enemy established village military security sub-stations (consisting of three to five persons each). They were commanded by military security agents coming from higher levels to act as key personnel to protect (RVN) armed forces in villages and hamlets (to include Regional and Popular Force units and People's Self-Defense Force personnel). They also took charge of intelligence and fifth columnist activities. They considered these activities the most effective measures to protect their forces.

5. Phường Hoàng Committees:

(A combined intelligence organization commanded by CIA personnel)

The Phường Hoàng Committee was organized in late 1968. In late 1970, its agencies were widely established from the national level to region, province, district, and village levels. In addition, Phường Hoàng mobile ((intelligence)) cells were organized by each level to operate and to motivate lower levels.

Each Phường Hoàng Committee has a central office. The composition of Phường Hoàng Committees at all levels consists of public security, police, intelligence, military security, pacification, civil affairs, psywar, and Chiêu Hồi (Open-Arms) personnel. (However, public security agents, policemen, and intelligence agents played the key role in their activities.)

At province and village levels, the province and village chiefs usually served as chairmen of the Phường Hoàng Committees and the vice-chairmen commanded all public security agents, policemen, and military intelligence agents.

Each Phường Hoàng center from district level and higher was directly guided by a US advisor (CIA personnel) with a number of cadre, public security agents, policemen, and intelligence personnel serving as coordinators.

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In a village, the standby cadre of the Phường Hoàng Village Committee is the chief of the village police sub-station. In a city, the chief of a Phường Hoàng Committee in a ward is the chief of a ward police sub-station.

6. In addition to the above public security, police, and intelligence organizations, there are also some other organizations such as:

Civil affairs: There were more than 1,000 civil affairs personnel in Saigon. It was reported that the enemy intended to deactivate the Civil Affairs Organization and merge it into the National Police forces. However, we later reported that it was reorganized by ((President)) Thiệu with a number of pacification personnel for reinforcements.

Biệt Kích ((GVN Special Forces)). The Biệt Kích Inter-Group 81 was previously placed under the direct control of US commanders. Now it has been handed over to the Puppet Army. We do not know the exact strength of the (GVN) Biệt Kích Force but we know that it consists of two kinds of forces.

The Biệt Kích Force in charge of attacking NVN.

The Biệt Kích Force operating in mountainous and border areas in SVN. (In 1968 there were 18 (GVN) Biệt Kích Cs ((companies)) in Tây Ninh ((Province)). Now there are only seven companies designated as Unit B16)

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The Biệt Kích Force consisted of many ruffians, scoundrels, orphans, ethnic minority people, and refugees coming from NVN.

At present, three Biệt Kích platoons and three Biệt Kích groups are operating in the mountainous areas, areas bordering T5 and T10 ((VC MR 5 and 10)), Tây Ninh ((Province)), and in the northeastern part of K ((Khmer Republic)). The enemy has recently selected 1,100 Biệt Kích men and sent them to a special training course. They will be sent to operate in the mountainous and border areas and in the Khmer Republic upon completion of their training course.

Pacification Group: It previously had approximately 60,000 pacification personnel. However, at the beginning of 1971, it was reorganized by the enemy with a total strength of 25,000 men. The remaining personnel were assigned to the Police Force.

In addition, there were semispecialized organizations operating as political parties; religious and national reactionary political organizations and ethnic minority people.

Besides the Puppet public security, police and intelligence organizations in SVN, there are also US intelligence organizations such as the (CIA) and (DIA) ((Defense Intelligence Agency)) and other espionage organizations from imperialist countries such as Japan, France, England, and Tùong ((possibly meaning Nationalist China)) as well as espionage agents recruited by ((Prime Minister)) Lon Nol in K ((Khmer Republic)).

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In Apr 71, we learned that the CIA also established an "international security" organization consisting of intelligence agencies of satellite countries in Asia for coordination in intelligence activities. ((President)) Thieu assigned Bul Van Nhu, Deputy Chief of the National Police Force, to act as vice-chairman of this "international security" organization.

((One line missing)) to oppress the people, and carry out espionage activities to attack revolutionary installations in villages and hamlets. Most of them have attended intelligence training courses. Above all, they have been trained on assessing the situation, discovering revolutionary personnel, and recruiting secret agents. The enemy prescribed that each (RVN) administrative agent must recruit at least three ((secret)) agents.

At present, in enemy ((GVN)) controlled areas and in disputed areas, the enemy has effectively established and consolidated the hamlet and village administrative machinery. This has created many difficulties for us. Each (RVN) village administrative section consists of from five to seven personnel and each hamlet administrative section of from three to seven persons. Among the hamlet and village ((RVN)) administrative personnel there are experienced personnel, tyrants, and stubborn and dangerous individuals who have attacked and destroyed revolutionary organizations. They inflicted losses on friendly forces and impeded the revolutionary movement. However, some of the new administrative personnel were forced to work for the enemy.

II. ((INTELLIGENCE)) ACTIVITIES:

The enemy used all types of forces to attack us in mountainous, lowland and city areas. For example, he closely coordinated operations of the public security, police intelligence, Biệt Kích, reconnaissance, pacification, psywar, and Chiêu Hồi ((open-arm)) forces with his military forces (such as Regular, Regional or Popular Forces) and in-place forces, to include hamlet and village administrative personnel and reactionary ((political)) parties, religious sects, and ethnic minority people.

He closely coordinated operations of (RVN espionage) agents with those of the Lon Nol Administration.

He closely coordinated operations of his personnel from all echelons with his in-place forces in our infrastructure.

He closely coordinated operations of his overt and covert forces with his armed forces and operations of his

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specialized and semispecialized forces with his intelligence organizations. He also used economic, cultural, and social forces to support his espionage activities.

His operating procedures and schemes were varied, cruel, flagrant, and effective.

He concentrated his forces to attack our important areas under different forms and flexibly operated according to the specific situation of each area or each objective to support his pacification plan.

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